

## **WHY HAVE THIS WEBSITE?**

There is a constant demand from students attending schools, colleges and universities for information on **football safety** and up until now the provision of this information by clubs in Scotland has been very fragmented.

Hopefully, in the pages that follow, you will find sufficient information to complete your particular project or be encouraged to extend your research further by referring to the source documents mentioned.

The information provided has been gathered together from existing material distributed by members of the Football Safety Officers Association (Scotland).

## **WHAT IS THE FOOTBALL SAFETY OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (SCOTLAND) AND HOW IS IT CONSTITUTED?**

### **ORIGIN**

The **Football Safety Officers Association (Scotland)** was formed in **May 1997**

### **MEMBERSHIP**

Its membership comprises the Safety Officers ,Deputy Safety Officers and Assistant Safety Officer from the 12 Scottish Premier League clubs and the 30 Scottish Football League 1, 2 and 3<sup>rd</sup> Divisions clubs.

### **OBJECTIVES**

The objectives of the Association shall be to:

- a) Have exchanges of information regarding football safety for the benefit and in the interests of individual members, their Clubs' and clients.
- b) Assist where possible with any matters affecting members

These objectives shall be achieved by conferences, meetings, seminars and other events arranged on a non-profit basis

### **THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE**

The current Executive Committee comprises:

#### **Chairman**

Mr. John Morgan  
Aberdeen Football Club  
Pittodrie Stadium  
Pittodrie Street  
Aberdeen  
AB24 5QU

#### **Vice-Chairman/Secretary**

Mr. Ronnie Hawthorn  
Celtic FC  
Glasgow  
G40 3RE

#### **Treasurer**

Mr. Ken Davis  
Albion Rovers FC  
Cliftonhill  
Main St  
Coatbridge  
ML 5 3RB

#### **Honorary President**

Sir John Orr, OBE, QPM

## **REGIONALISATION**

The Association, to enhance its overall objective to improve safety at football grounds, adopt best practice; enhance stewarding and safety officers' expertise; and to stimulate greater debate in less formal settings than the National forum, is sub-divided into 3 Regional areas: -

**(a) THE NORTH/NORTH EAST**

(Aberdeen, Arbroath, Brechin City, Dundee, Dundee United, Elgin City, Forfar Athletic, Inverness Caledonian Thistle, Montrose, Peterhead, Ross County and Saint Johnstone)

**(b) THE WEST/SOUTH WEST**

(Annan Athletic, Airdrie United, Albion Rovers, Ayr United, Celtic, Dumbarton, Hamilton Academical, Kilmarnock, Morton, Motherwell, Partick Thistle, Queen of the South, Queen's Park, Rangers, Saint Mirren and Stranraer)

and

**(c) THE CENTRAL/EAST**

(Alloa, Berwick Rangers, Clyde, Cowdenbeath, Dunfermline, East Fife, East Stirlingshire, Falkirk, Heart of Midlothian, Hibernian, Livingston, Raith Rovers, Stenhousemuir and Stirling Albion)

Each Region has its own Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer and meets twice per annum – i.e.

- (i) one month prior to the Association's Annual General Meeting; and
- (ii) one month prior to the Association's autumn meeting.

The Chairman (or in his absence, the Vice-Chairman or Secretary) thereafter gives an oral report to the Association's Annual General and Autumn Meetings on the progress of his or her Region along with local comment on any issues affecting the Association at that time.

## **WHAT IS A FOOTBALL SAFETY OFFICER?**

The **GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS**, encourages football clubs to appoint persons who meet the following requirements:

**(a) COMPETENCE**

A person will be regarded as competent for the role of safety officer when he or she has sufficient training and experience, or knowledge, to be able to implement the functions required as detailed in the job description.

It is recommended that a safety officer should as a minimum have, or be working towards, a level 4 spectator safety qualification on the relevant qualification framework.

**(b) STATUS**

On event days, a safety officer should be able to establish his or her status in the chain of command, in relation to all staff and safety personnel, and, where applicable, in relation to representatives of the emergency services. On non-event days, the safety officer should be regarded as a principal adviser to the ground management on all spectator-related safety issues.

**(c) AUTHORITY**

On event days, a safety officer should have the authority to make safety-related decisions without having to refer to senior management or board members.

**(d) ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCESS TO MANAGEMENT**

A safety officer should be accountable to the most senior management, to whom the right of direct access is essential.

**(e) IDENTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION**

On event days it is essential that the safety officer is easily identifiable, and can be contacted immediately at all times. If it is necessary during an event for the safety officer to leave the control point, a competent person should be left on duty in the control point. The safety officer should also remain in direct contact with that person, either by radio or mobile telephone.

### **WHAT DOES A FOOTBALL SAFETY OFFICER DO?**

The best way to help you understand the complexities of organising a major football match safely is to ask you to imagine that **YOU** have just been appointed as a **Safety Officer** at one of Scotland's Premier League or Football League clubs.

The first thing **YOU** might want to do in your new role is to familiarise yourself with your local Ground and any history pertaining to it, particularly in relation to mishaps, accidents or disasters.

It would be important for **YOU** to be aware of such incidents although, in this particular case, no doubt reassuring to note that the modern Ibrox Stadium has no history of serious mishaps, accidents or disasters and that the infamous Stairway 13 no longer exists.

As a new Safety Officer **YOU** might also wish to quickly acquaint yourself with the following Reports:

- (a) THE SHORTT REPORT**
- (b) THE MOELWYN HUGHES REPORT**
- (c) THE CHESTER REPORT**
- (d) THE HARRINGTON REPORT**
- (e) THE LANG REPORT**
- (f) THE WHEATLEY REPORT**
- (g) THE McELHONE REPORT**
- (h) THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT WORKING GROUP REPORT**
- (i) THE POPPLEWELL REPORT**

**and**

- (j) THE TAYLOR REPORT.**

#### **THE SHORT REPORT:**

On the 11<sup>th</sup> of June 1923, the then Secretary of State for the Home Department asked the Rt. Hon. Edward Shortt, KC, to form a committee to inquire, amongst other things, into arrangements made to deal with the abnormally large attendances on special occasions, especially attendances at athletic grounds. This arose from disorder which occurred at Wemble Stadium on the occasion of the first cup final on the 28<sup>th</sup> of April 1923.

#### **THE MOELWYN HUGHES REPORT:**

The next Report arose out of the disaster at Bolton Wanderers' Football Ground on the 9<sup>th</sup> of March 1946. Mr. R Moelwyn Hughes, KC, was appointed by the then Home Secretary to conduct an enquiry

into the circumstances of the disaster which arose by the presence of some 85,000 spectators. Only 50,000 had been expected and because of the press of people in an enclosure two barriers collapsed and 33 people were killed.

#### **THE CHESTER REPORT:**

In June 1966, the then Secretary of State for Education and Science appointed Mr.

Norman Chester, CBE, as he then was (Warden of Nuffield College), to chair an Enquiry.

His terms of reference were:

**“To enquire into the state of Association Football at all levels, including the organisation, management, finance and administration, and the means by which the game may be developed for the public good; and to make recommendations.”**

#### **THE HARRINGTON REPORT:**

This Report was made to the then Minister of Sport in 1968 and concluded:

**“The solution of the problems of hooliganism in the football stadium is ultimately the responsibility of individual clubs who must deal with it in the light of local circumstances. While a few clubs are exemplary in their attitude to the problem others are laissez-faire and need persuasion to take a more active role in trying to control hooliganism in their own ground. This laissez-faire attitude does not help the police in their attempts to deal with the matter.”**

#### **THE LANG REPORT:**

Shortly thereafter, a Working Party under the chairmanship of Sir John Lang, GCB, and including a number of distinguished members, was appointed by the then Minister with special responsibility for Sport to examine the problems involved in football crowd behaviour to which attention had been called a few months previously by the HARRINGTON REPORT. Sir John's Report was presented on 21 November 1969 and by way of introduction said:

**“The Working Party was dealing with a subject which has been discussed almost ad nauseam during recent years. Not unexpectedly the Working Party has not found a single solution for a problem which is often due to combination of factors.....”**

#### **. THE WHEATLEY REPORT:**

On 4 February 1971 the Rt. Hon. Lord Wheatley was asked by the then Secretary of State for the Home Department and the then Secretary of State for Scotland to make an independent appraisal of the effectiveness of existing arrangements for crowd safety at sports ground in Great Britain, and of the improvements which could be brought about within the present framework of the law, and to consider

the nature of any alternations in the law which appeared to be needed. This arose from the disaster at Ibrox where 66 spectators died.

Lord Wheatley ended his Report saying:

**“I trust this Report may be of assistance to you in deciding what should be done to solve this important question of crowd safety in football grounds. One thing is certain. The public demand for something to be done has been growing over the years. I am sure I am reflecting public opinion when I say something must be done now. The evidence certainly supports that view.”**

#### **THE McELHONE REPORT:**

In October 1976 the then Secretary of State for Scotland asked Mr. Frank McElhone, MP, to chair a Working Group on Football Crowd behaviour:

**“to consider the problems caused by some Scottish football supporters and to make recommendations to the Scottish Football Association and other organisations concerned.”**

#### **THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT WORKING GROUP REPORT:**

The next publication was the Report of an Official Working Group on Football Spectator Violence set up by the Department of the Environment. The Working Group was set up following serious incidents of violence involving British supporters at England’s soccer matches in Luxembourg and France in November 1983 and February 1984 respectively. It dealt with problems arising out of international football.

#### **THE POPPLEWELL REPORT:**

On the 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1985 Mr. Justice Popplewell was appointed to undertake an Inquiry with the following terms of reference:

**“To inquire, with particular reference to the events at Bradford and Birmingham football grounds on 11 May, into the operation of the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975; and to recommend what if any Further steps should be taken, including any that may be necessary Under additional powers, to improve both crowd safety and crowd Control at sports grounds.”**

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Scotland presented his Report to Parliament in January 1986.

[The POPPLEWELL REPORT, incidentally, also contains an excellent chapter on ‘HOOLIGANISM’ which is a subject many students are particularly interested in.]

All reports detailed are summarised in the Popplewell report

## **THE TAYLOR REPORT:**

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of April 1989 the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor was appointed by the Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP, to carry out an Inquiry with the following terms of reference:

**“To inquire into the events at Sheffield Wednesday football Ground on 15 April 1989 and to make recommendations about The needs of crowd control and safety at sports events.”**

His Report was presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department in January 1990. This Report, being the last one written in consequence of a football related disaster in the United Kingdom, is particularly interesting and has 5 main headings:

- **FOOTBALL: PAST AND PRESENT;**
- **SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS;**
- **CROWD CONTROL AND HOOLIGANISM;**
- **THE FOOTBALL SPECTATORS ACT 1989;** and
- **FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS.**

## **THE GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS**

Further essential reading is the **Fifth Edition** of the **GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS**.

This publication is an advisory document for use by competent persons and is the distillation of many years of research and experience of the safety management and design of sports grounds.

The **GUIDE** has no statutory force but many of its recommendations will be given force of law at individual grounds by their inclusion in General Safety Certificates issued under the **SAFETY OF SPORTS GROUNDS ACT 1975** or the **FIRE SAFETY AND SAFETY OF PLACES OF SPORTS ACT 1987**.

The concept of the **GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS** is widely attributed to Lord Wheatley who, at paragraph 69 of his Report, said:

**“While not seeking to set out a code of practice in the sense of statutory regulations which have to be observed in all cases I have with the assistance of the Technical Support Group, provided what should be regarded as guidelines towards a proper standard. I trust that these will be of benefit both to clubs in deciding what they should do in making improvements, and to licensing authorities in deciding what should be looked for.”**

Lord Wheatley subsequently produced a ‘Technical Report’ at **APPENDIX ‘A’** of his Report.

In due course the First, a revised version of the First; the Second; Third; Fourth and Fifth editions of the **GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS** have been produced by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and no respectable Football Safety Officer could function without referring to this publication.

The main paragraph **HEADINGS** in the **GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS** comprise:

1. **HOW TO USE THE GUIDE**
2. **CALCULATING THE SAFE CAPACITY OF A SPORTS GROUND**
3. **MANAGEMENT – RESPONSIBILITY AND PLANNING FOR SAFETY**
4. **MANAGEMENT – STEWARDING**
5. **MANAGEMENT – STRUCTURES, INSTALLATIONS AND COMPONENTS**
6. **CIRCULATION – GENERAL**
7. **CIRCULATION – INGRESS**
8. **CIRCULATION – VERTICAL CIRCULATION**

9. CIRCULATION – CONCOURSES AND VOMITORIES
10. CIRCULATION – EGRESS AND EMERGENCY EVACUATION
11. BARRIERS
12. SPECTATOR ACCOMMODATION – SEATING
13. SPECTATOR ACCOMMODATION – STANDING
14. SPECTATOR ACCOMMODATION – TEMPORARY DEMOUNTABLE STRUCTURES
15. FIRE SAFETY
16. COMMUNICATION
17. ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL SERVICES
18. FIRST AID AND MEDICAL PROVISION
19. MEDIA PROVISION
20. ALTERNATIVE USES FOR SPORTS GROUNDS

Section 3 of the fifth edition of **GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS** emphasises:

**“Responsibility for the safety of spectators lies at all times with the ground management. The management will normally be either the owner or lessee of the ground, who may not necessarily be the promoter of the event.**

**Representatives of the local authority, together with police, fire and ambulance should- preferably through a coordinated approach- advise management on how to discharge this responsibility and, in certain circumstances, may require measures to be taken in order to achieve reasonable safety standards. This does not, however, exonerate the ground management from its responsibility for the safety of spectators”**  
.”

This quite clearly places a heavy onus on club management everywhere to cheerfully meet their obligations with regard safety. This is not always recognised however, and something else Lord Justice Taylor regrettably felt obliged to say in Paragraph 24 of his Report may still ring true:

**“Amazingly, complacency was still to be found even after Hillsborough. It was chilling to hear the same refrain from directors at several clubs I visited – [“Hillsborough was horrible – but, of course, it couldn’t have happened here.”] Couldn’t it? The Hillsborough ground was regarded by many as one of the best in the country. It was selected by the FA for the cup semifinal and thought by them to be entirely suitable. The identical fixture had passed off uneventfully the previous year. I have little doubt that if the disaster scenario had been described to the management at Hillsborough prior to 15 April, they too would have said [“Of course, it couldn’t have happened here.”] Yet something like it had happened at Hillsborough in 1981, albeit with less dire results. Moreover, I am satisfied from eyewitness accounts I have received that there have been many other occasions when overcrowding has led, at various grounds round the country, to a genuine apprehension of impending disaster through crushing, averted only by good fortune. I have heard from Police Commanders at a number of the grounds I visited how relieved they are that capacities have reduced in the interests of safety.”**

Lord Wheatley also suggested that football grounds should be licensed and said respectively in paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 of his Report:

**“The system most widely advocated is the licensing of grounds by a local authority. Such a proposal has been mooted over the years. It finds its place in the Report of the Departmental Committee on Crowds in 1924 and in Mr. Hughes’s Report on the Bolton Disaster in 1946.”**

**“The broad argument in favour of it is as follows. The public pay for admission to a football ground; therefore there is a duty on the club to see that the ground is safe for those who pay for admission. In other fields of entertainment similar considerations have led to a system of licensing by a local authority. There is accordingly no good reason why football grounds should not be similarly dealt with. It would simply mean extending a well-established system to football grounds.”**

**“To this broad argument there are added particular advantages which it is claimed the proposal has over its competitors. If an application is made for a licence, the local authority would have to be satisfied that all statutory requirements had been observed. They could call for reports as they saw fit from a variety of sources under or connected with their administration. Building inspectors, engineers, sanitary inspectors, surveyors, architects, police and fire officers would be among the disciplines at their disposal. It would presumably be competent for any of these bodies to place before the licensing court objections or considerations. On the other hand the applicant club would be entitled to submit what representations or evidence it chose. The licensing bench would be a local body which would more readily appreciate the various considerations involved. So runs the argument.”**

These proposals were subsequently adopted in the **SAFETY OF SPORTS GROUNDS ACT 1975**.

This particular piece of legislation created **‘Safety Certificates’** in respect of sports grounds with accommodation for more than 10,000 spectators and gave powers of entry and inspection to persons authorised by the local authority, the chief officer of police and the building authority.

Mindful that **YOU** are still acting out the role of a Safety Officer, it would certainly be wise to familiarise yourself with this particular piece of legislation and the Safety Certificate it subsequently created for the ground at which you are now theoretically employed.

## **THE HISTORY OF DISASTERS**

The importance of maintaining a safe environment can never be underestimated and an awareness of all previous tragedies and how they occurred is helpful in planning to avoid others

**(1) APRIL, 1902, GLASGOW, SCOTLAND**

(25 killed and 516 injured when the West Stand at Ibrox Stadium collapsed during a Scotland versus England international match.)

**(2) MARCH, 1946, BOLTON, ENGLAND**

(33 killed and 400 injured when a wall collapsed at Burden Park before an FA cup tie between Bolton Wanderers and Stoke City.)

**(3) MARCH, 1955, SANTIAGO, CHILE**

(6 killed when 70,000 tried to jam into the National Stadium for the final of the South American Championship in which Argentina beat Chile 1-0.)

**(4) SEPTEMBER, 1962, LIBREVILLE, GABON**

(9 killed and 30 injured when a landslide engulfed part of the stadium during an international between Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville.)

**(5) MAY, 1964, LIMA, PERU**

(318 killed and 500 injured at the National Stadium after Argentina beat Peru in an Olympic qualifying match. Trouble broke out when the referee disallowed a Peruvian goal in the final two minutes.)

**(6) JUNE, 1968, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA**

(74 killed and 150 injured after a league game between River Plate and Boca Juniors. People trying to leave were crushed against locked exits and burning papers were thrown down by celebrating fans in an upper tier.)

**(7) JANUARY, 1971, GLASGOW, SCOTLAND**

(66 killed and 145 injured when fans tried to turn back on a staircase at Ibrox Stadium after a late Rangers equaliser in the derby against Celtic.)

**(8) MARCH, 1971, SALVADOR, BRAZIL**

(4 killed and 1,500 injured in panic caused by a fight and a stampede in grandstand.)

**(9) FEBRUARY, 1974, CAIRO, EGYPT**

(49 killed and 50 injured as crowds attempting to enter the Zamalek Stadium for a top club game broke down the barriers and a wall collapsed.)

**(10) OCTOBER, 1976, YAOUNDE, CAMEROON**

(2 killed in fighting after a penalty was awarded to Cameroon in a World Cup qualifying tie against Congo and the Congolese keeper tried to attack the Gambian referee.)

**(11) DECEMBER, 1976, PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI**

- (6 killed, including 2 children, at a World Cup qualifier between Haiti and Cuba. When Cuba scored, a Haitian fan set off a firecracker. Fans feared gunfire and panicked, knocking down a soldier, whose gun went off and killed a small boy and girl. Further panic caused 2 people to be trampled to death, and one man died jumping over a wall. The soldier committed suicide.)
- (12) MAY 1978, GHANA**
- (15 killed and 35 injured when a wall collapsed.)
- (13) AUGUST 1979, NIGERIA**
- (24 killed and 27 injured in a stampede following floodlight failure.)
- (14) FEBRUARY 1981, PIRAEES, GREECE** (24 killed in an end  
of match stampede for exits.)
- (15) 1981 IBAGUE, COLUMBIA**
- (18 killed and 45 injured when a wall collapsed during a match between Deportes Tolima and Deportivo Cali.)
- (16) JULY 1982, MOSCOW, RUSSIA**
- (77 killed when fans leaving the National Stadium tried to re-enter the stands after a last minute goal in a UEFA cup tie between Spartak Moscow and Haarlem. Unofficial reports put the death toll at 340.)
- (17) NOVEMBER 1982, ALGIERS**
- (10 killed after a concrete roof collapsed inside a stadium.)
- (18) NOVEMBER 1982, CALI, COLUMBIA**
- (24 killed and 250 injured after drunken youths urinated from an upper tier of the Pascual Guerrero Stadium, provoking a stampede below.)
- (19) MAY 1985, BRADFORD, ENGLAND**
- (56 killed and more than 200 injured when fire engulfed the main stand at the Valley Parade Stadium.)
- (20) MAY 1985, MEXICO CITY, MEXICO**
- (10 trampled to death and 29 injured when they tried to force entry into a stadium to see a domestic match.)
- (21) MAY 1985, HEYSEL, BELGIUM**
- (39 fans, mostly Italians, killed as they tried to escape rioting English supporters before the Champions Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool at the Heysel Stadium.)
- (22) MARCH 1988, TIPOLI, LIBYA**
- (30 killed and 40 injured when a stand collapsed just before half-time during a friendly international between Libya and Malta being watched by a crowd of 65,000. Fans panicked after a man brandishing a knife or gun went berserk. Hundreds rushed for the exit and a wall collapsed under their weight at the back of the stands.)

**(23) MARCH 1988, KATMANDU, NEPAL**

(70 killed when a sudden electric storm provoked a stampede towards locked exits at Nepal's National Stadium during a match between Janakpur of Nepal and Muktiyodha of Bangladesh.)

**(24) APRIL 1989, SHEFFIELD, ENGLAND**

(95 killed and 200 injured in Britain's worst sports disaster. Too many fans were allowed into the Leppings Lane End at Hillsborough, Sheffield, crushing others against the perimeter fence at a FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. The total number of deaths became 96 when Tony Bland died after being in a coma for almost four years.)

**(25) MAY 1989, LAGOS, NIGERIA**

(12 killed and a player died on the field during a World Cup tie between Nigeria and Angola. Nigerian winger Sam Okwaraji collapsed from exhaustion in the 82<sup>nd</sup> minute.)

**(26) JULY 1990, MOGADISHU**

(7 killed and 18 injured after President Mohammed Siad Barre's bodyguards opened fire to quell a disturbance.)

**(27) JANUARY 1991, ORKNEY, TRANSVAAL**

(40 killed and 50 injured in South Africa's worst sports disaster. A refereeing decision triggered violence and a stampede during a pre-season 'friendly' between arch rivals Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates.)

**(28) JULY 1991, NAIROBI, KENYA**

(1 fan killed and 24 injured in a stampede during an African Nations Cup qualifier between Kenya and Mozambique.)

**(29) MAY 1992, BASTIA, CORSICA**

(15 die when a temporary stand at the Furiani Stadium collapsed just before kick-off at the French Cup semi-final between Bastia and Marseille.)

**(30) JULY 1992, RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL**

(50 injured after falling five meters from the upper tier at the Maracana Stadium when part of the fencing gave way before a National Championship match between Flamengo and Botafogo.)

**(31) MAY 1994, MONROVIA, LIBERIA**

(2 killed and 26 injured when a rail broke at the Samuel Doe Stadium after Liberia's 1-0 defeat of Togo in the first leg qualifier of an African Nations Cup qualifier.)

**(32) APRIL 1995, FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE**

(40 injured as the main gate collapsed on fans scrambling for tickets outside the main stadium.)

**(33) JUNE 1996, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA**

(9 killed and 78 injured during a stampede following Zambia's victory over Sudan in a World Cup qualifier.)

**(34) OCTOBER 1996, GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA**

(81 killed and 147 seriously injured by crushing one hour before the Guatemala versus Costa Rica World Cup tie when an estimated 60,000 entered the Stadio Meteo Flores in respect of which only 45,000 tickets had been printed. Forged tickets and cash-in-hand bribery suspected.)

**(35) APRIL 1998, ZIMBABWE**

(4 killed in a stampede trying to get into a packed stadium for a free match.)

**(36) JANUARY 1999, ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT**

(8 killed and 13 injured after 25,000 fans pushed and shoved to get into Alexandria Stadium.)

**(37) JULY 2000, HARARE, ZIMBABWE**

(13 killed in a stampede when police fired tear gas into a 60,000 crowd after bottles and other missiles were thrown on to the pitch during the World Cup qualifier between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The incident happened 8 minutes from time when South Africa went two goals ahead.)

**(38) DECEMBER 2000, BRAZIL**

(150 injured when part of the perimeter fence around the pitch collapsed in the Sao Januario Stadium, Brazil, 23 minutes into the second leg of the Joao Havelange Cup Final between Vasco Da Gama and Sao Caetano.)

**(39) APRIL 2001, SOUTH AFRICA**

(43 killed and hundred injured in a stampede at a match between Orlando Pirates and Kaiser Chiefs at Ellis Park Stadium, Johannesburg when 80,000 filled a 60,000 stadium with 15,000 still locked outside.)

**(40) APRIL 2001, CONGO**

(7 killed and 51 injured in crushing accident after police fired tear gas to quell fans at a match between Lupopo and Mazembe.)

**(41) MAY 2001, SARI, IRAN**

(2 killed and over 300 injured when 30,000 crammed into a 10,000 capacity stadium to watch a match between Pirouzi and Shamushak in the Mottaqi Stadium. Part of a roof collapsed when metal awnings gave way under the weight of spectators perched on top.)

**(42) MAY 2001, ACCRA, GHANA**

(137 killed and hundreds injured in a stampede when police fired tear gas on fans who were throwing bottles and chairs onto the field at a match between Accra and Asante.)

**CRIMINAL LEGISLATION AFFECTING FANS**

Whilst responsibility for **PUBLIC SAFETY** now clearly rests with club management, the preservation of **PUBLIC ORDER**, albeit more and more supported by club stewards, is a task undertaken by the police.

The most common charges libeled against football fans by the police include the following:

**(a) ASSAULT**

(Every attack directed to take effect physically on the person of another, provided there is criminal intent, is assault, whether or not actual injury is inflicted.)

**(b) BREACH OF THE PEACE**

(Breach of the peace is constituted by one or more persons conducting himself or themselves anywhere in a riotous or disorderly manner to the alarm, annoyance or disturbance of the lieges.)

**(c) THE CRIMINAL LAW (CONSOLIDATION)(SCOTLAND) ACT 1995**

(Penalises those who, travel to an from sporting events, whilst carrying alcohol on buses and trains; those attempting to enter or found inside a sports found with controlled containers (bottles, cans, etceteras); those attempting to enter or found inside a sports ground whilst in possession of alcohol; and those attempting to enter or found inside a sports ground whilst drunk.)

**THE LORD ADVOCATE'S INSTRUCTION TO CHIEF CONSTABLES REGARDING INCIDENTS DURING SPORTING EVENTS**

Football players are not themselves exempt from criminal charges for unlawful actions perpetrated during sporting events and the following instructions have been issued by the Lord Advocate, Scotland's senior prosecutor, to all Chief Constables, more particularly for the attention of Police Match Commanders:

- 1 The Lord Advocate recognises that the principal reason for the presence of police officers at sporting events is to ensure crowd safety at the beginning of, during and after the event. Taking steps to ensure crowd safety is the duty to which police officers should give priority whilst they are in attendance at sporting events. However, from time to time incidents occur in which one or more of the participants in the sporting fixture itself become involved in conduct which could be viewed as constituting criminal behaviour. In some instances police officers will themselves witness the incident. In others, the circumstances will be reported to the police, either immediately or at a later stage. Some incidents, particularly those involving the use of physical violence, attract considerable public attention. Such attention is more likely when the incident is witnessed by a large crowd or when it is televised. Moreover, the conduct of the**

participants in a sporting event may have a bearing on the subsequent conduct of those spectating. For all these reasons the Lord Advocate considers that it would be helpful to those who attend sporting events, whether as participants, officials, spectators or police officers, if he were to issue instructions to chief constables as to the approach he wishes to be followed by the police in the investigation of incidents of violent behaviour or disorderly conduct on or in the immediate vicinity of the field of play and the reporting of such incidents to the Procurator Fiscal.

2. The Lord Advocate is firmly of the view that all those involved in the administration, refereeing and playing of sports have the initial and the major responsibilities to avoid and in any event to deal with excessive violence or serious disorderly conduct on the part of players, coaches and managers. These responsibilities rest on clubs, managers, referees and the governing bodies of individual sports and the Lord Advocate expects these to be treated seriously. Nothing in these instructions seeks to interfere with or diminish the authority of such individuals and bodies. In particular the responsibility of the referee and other officials to control a sporting fixture and those participating in it must remain paramount. However, even if those involved seek to discharge their responsibilities to the best of their abilities, sportsmen cannot be regarded as exempt from compliance with the criminal law. On occasion their conduct may make it appropriate for the police and the Procurator Fiscal to take action.
3. The Lord Advocate recognises that some sports, such as football, ice hockey, rugby and shinty, involve deliberate physical contact and a measure of aggression as essential elements of the game. In these sports the participants know (and by taking part accept) that such deliberate physical contact may result in injury. By taking part they assume the risk that the deliberate physical contact may have harmful effects, including serious injury. However, where the violence used goes well beyond what can be regarded as normal physical contact for the sport concerned, no question of consent arises and an assault may have been committed. If a police officer witnesses or learns of an incident at a sporting fixture, which has gone well beyond what can be regarded as normal physical contact in the sport concerned, then consideration should be given by a senior officer as to whether the incident should be investigated and the circumstances of the incident reported to the Procurator Fiscal for consideration of prosecution or some alternative disposal. Similarly, if the police learn of an incident where a participant in a sporting fixture appears to have conducted himself in a disorderly or seriously provocative manner, the crime of breach of the peace may well have been committed. In such circumstances, also, a senior officer should consider whether the incident should be the subject of investigation and report.
4. The Lord Advocate takes the view that incidents of violent or disorderly behaviour by sportsmen, including coaches and managers (in so-called technical areas or elsewhere), may require to be investigated by the police and reported to the Procurator Fiscal even if no complaint has been made to the police by a participant in the game or an official.
5. All contact sports are regulated by referees who have powers to award penalties and fouls for violent play and to warn players and send them from the field of play in punishment of such conduct. The fact that a player has been penalised or sent from the field of play does not necessarily mean that police involvement is appropriate. Conversely, the fact that neither the referee nor the linesman have intervened to deal with a violent incident would not necessarily exclude police involvement.
6. The Lord Advocate considers that experienced police officers are well able to identify incidents where the conduct involved falls to be viewed as criminal behaviour warranting investigation by them. For that reason these instructions do not seek to define in detail the circumstances in which police officers should take action. Moreover, the Lord Advocate recognises that police match and game commanders should exercise a broad discretion in the performance of their duties during sporting events. In exercise of their duty to ensure crowd safety police officers have the discretion to speak to an individual spectator about his behaviour, to eject such an individual from the sports

ground or arrest that individual, as seems appropriate in the circumstances. Equally the Lord Advocate recognises that police officers are entitled to exercise a discretion in relation to incidents involving players, coaches and managers. Police officers are under no obligation to institute an investigation and make a report to the Procurator Fiscal merely because a complaint has been received. However, the Lord Advocate wishes the police to investigate and, where appropriate, report to the Procurator Fiscal incidents where the violence used by a participant goes well beyond that which would be expected to occur during the normal run of play and that which the rules of the sport concerned are designed to regulate. In deciding which incidents to investigate the police should pay particular regard to incidents where the violence or disorderly behaviour has occurred after the whistle has been blown and whilst the ball is dead and to incidents where the violence or disorderly behaviour has occurred in circumstances designed or liable to provoke a disorderly or violent response from spectators.

7. When an incident is reported to the Procurator Fiscal, the best evidence available should be submitted with the report. Any video recordings or other photographic evidence available should be recovered by the police and forward to the Procurator Fiscal.
8. The Lord Advocate also wishes the police to report on what sanctions, if any, the club or sporting authority concerned is liable to take or has already taken to discipline and punish those involved for their conduct. That information may be relevant to any decisions to be taken by the Procurator Fiscal.
9. While cautioning and charging of an accused would normally precede the submission of a police report, that is not, of course, invariable practice. In cases where the police seek guidance or instruction from the Procurator Fiscal, a preliminary report may be submitted.
10. When investigations are instituted, both preliminary and final reports should be submitted to the Procurator Fiscal, as soon as practicable. Experience suggests that where there is uncertainty as to whether or not a report is to be submitted, public attention and media speculation flourish. Procurator Fiscals for their part will deal with such reports promptly.
11. Chief Constables will understand that it is always open to a Procurator Fiscal to call for a report on an incident which has come to his attention, whether or not such incident has been reported by the police. However, the Lord Advocate considers that it will only be on rare occasions that a Procurator Fiscal will find it necessary to take the initiative and instruct a report.
12. These instructions are issued by the Lord Advocate in terms of Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) act 1995.

Mackay of Drumadoon  
 Lord Advocate  
 10 July 1996”

## **YOUR FIRST MATCH AS A SAFETY OFFICER**

Imagine now that the Club that has employed **YOU** has just been drawn away from home in the Scottish Cup against either Rangers or Celtic and that the match is to be played 3 weeks on Saturday.

What preparation might the Safety Officers from Rangers or Celtic now be contemplating?

The first thing he would have to determine is the kick-off time and whether or not the maximum crowd is to be permitted.

It goes without saying therefore that the stadium capacity could diminish depending upon what segregation arrangements are agreed with the police in the interests of public safety.

Having decided the crowd capacity and the kick-off time, which sometimes has a tremendous bearing on the levels of disorder encountered, the Safety Officer will undoubtedly then interest himself in the intentions of the Police Commander and monitor closely his preparations for the match.

Together the Safety Officer and the Police Commander will agree how many police officers and stewards are necessary to maintain both public safety and public order.

These numbers, of course, can fluctuate either way, substantially up on occasions, depending on the importance of the particular fixture and the tensions prevailing between both sets of fans at the time.

The above police numbers, incidentally, did not include their Traffic Department who mounted a complimentary operation to ensure the free flow of vehicular traffic to and from the ground and guaranteed that the designated emergency routes were kept clear throughout.

It is important in the event of a disaster or major accident that ambulances, fire brigades, and police vehicles have unimpeded access and egress.

The Safety Officer may also be invited to the Police Briefing for supervisory officers, the nature of which can vary significantly according to the individual style of the particular Police Commander.

One option is to brief on the Monday preceding the Saturday on which the game is to be played. This avoids a hurried presentation; creates a comfortable environment for the key supervisory officers to listen, learn, ask questions and clarify any ambiguous instructions, either there and then or upon further reflection at any time between the Monday and the Saturday; and much more importantly provides ample opportunity for these ranking officers to go away and cascade the briefing down to constable level in their own police divisions and departments.

Most Police Commanders prefer 'scripted' briefings, ensuring that nothing of importance is omitted. They also feel that in the event of something going tragically wrong a scripted briefing rather than mere recollection or scribbled notes would be much more acceptable to the presiding judge at any Public Inquiry.

The briefing will often be supported by visual aids which allow the Police Commander to point out and dwell on any important features such as segregation areas, after-match cordons, et cetera; and he or she will invariably hold the briefing at the actual ground thus affording an opportunity for any of his or her supervisory officers visiting there for the first time to fully familiarise themselves with their areas of responsibility before the match day.

Any additional information gleaned between the Monday and the Saturday is thereafter imparted to officers at a track-side briefing prior to the crowd entering the ground.

It also goes without saying that in order to achieve a flawless police operation clear and concise instructions must be in place in the form of a Match Order.

Today, many Police Commanders also rely on a document they refer to as the **POLICE COMMANDER'S GUIDE**, a document which evolves over a number of years at each ground and which itemises all known actions in the match operation and the precise times they have to be implemented in chronological order.

## THE STADIUM CONTROL POINT

The Safety Officer and the Police Commander, between them, will usually have the following items at their disposal in the Police Control Room on match days:

- (a) **An aerial photograph of the ground and its environs.**  
  
(This helps to pinpoint the exact location of external problems and to determine which resources, police, stewards, or both, are best placed to respond.)
- (b) **A detailed plan of the ground showing individual stands, turnstiles and exit gates.**
- (c) **A schedule detailing all turnstiles and indicating what parts of the ground they each access.**  
  
(If information is received, for example, that known football hooligans have been entering via turnstile No. 7 it is important to know immediately what part of the ground they have occupied.)
- (d) **A schedule detailing all turnstiles in their individual groupings.**  
  
(If turnstiles 17 to 22, and 37 to 42 inclusive, for example, give access to a particular upper stand it is vital that this is known in the event that you reach capacity in that part of the ground and require to close the area down quickly. Turnstiles 17 to 42 inclusive is not the same as 17 to 22 and 37 to 42 inclusive. Turnstiles 18 to 36 inclusive access an entirely different part of the ground. You must know your turnstile combinations.)
- (e) **A copy of the Ground Standing Orders which address a whole range of issues, including evacuation procedures.**
- (f) **A copy of any local bye-laws.**  
  
(E.g. those prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic liquor in public places, in respect of which stewards or police may seek clarification.)
- (g) **A copy of the SFA Ground Regulations.**  
  
(No. 15 of which, for example, stipulates that – “All persons entering this Ground are admitted subject to the condition that they may be required to submit to search to prevent prohibited articles being brought into the ground which might be used to cause injury or damage to other persons or property.”)
- (h) **A copy of the Lord Advocate’s Instruction to Chief Constable.**
- (i) **A pre-prepared PUBLIC ADDRESS ANNOUNCEMENT which indicates that the match has been postponed before kick-off or abandoned during play together with details of the revised match arrangements.**  
  
(Some clubs are fortunate that each match at their ground is all-ticket and fans can always be re-admitted on production of their ticket stub. Other clubs are less fortunate and may have to deal with demands for cash refunds on the day or implement a voucher refund system. In

either event you have to be ready to deal with a postponement or abandonment at extremely short notice.)

- (k) A pre-prepared PUBLIC ADDRESS ANNOUNCEMENT in coded text, the content of which will indicate to both police and stewards that the match is to be postponed or abandoned in 5 minutes time.

(There is a procedure already in place whereby Police Match Commanders will be so advised by the match referee and the 5 minutes warning is essential to give them and the Safety Officers sufficient time to open exit gates, et cetera, before the crowd becomes aware of the circumstances and begin to disperse.)

- (l) Contingency plans, which are referred to in the Green Guide which depict suggested courses of action in the event of FIRE; BOMB THREAT; SUSPECT PACKAGE; DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES; POWER CUT OR FAILURE; GAS LEAK OR CHEMICAL INCIDENT; SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE, viz. TURNSTILE COUNTING MECHANISM, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION, PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM, ELECTRONIC INFORMATION BOARDS, STEWARDS' RADIO SYSTEM or INTERNAL TELEPHONE SYSTEMS; SURGING OR CRUSHING; PITCH INCURSION; LATE ARRIVALS OR DELAYED START; LOCK-OUTS; DISORDER IN THE GROUND or LARGE-SCALE TICKET FORGERY; or EMERGENCY EVACUATION.

and

- (m) Photographs of particular flags together with a brief history of each, items, which at Ibrox and Celtic Park can cause serious offence and provoke disorder.

**LIAISON BETWEEN THE SAFETY OFFICER, THE POLICE COMMANDER AND OTHER AGENCIES**

In between times the Safety Officer and the Police Commander, between them, will invariably:

- (a) Liaise with YOU in your capacity as the 'AWAY' Safety Officer.
- (b) Liaise with the HOME Ticket Centre in order to secure specimen match tickets in the event that any forgeries begin to circulate.
- (c) Ensure the attendance of suitably qualified Duty Doctors, Scottish Ambulance Service personnel, and volunteers from the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association or other first aid provider.
- (d) Liaise with the Communications Department of the local police force to ensure that sufficient radio systems, personal radios and standby technicians are available on the match day.
- (e) Conduct media interviews to appeal for fans to arrive early, park in the designated areas, refrain from drinking to excess and not to bring provocative flags, bottles, cans, et cetera.

- (f) **Gather relevant intelligence by speaking to supporters' organisations, rail companies, bus operators, shipping companies, airlines, other police forces, and the National Crime Intelligence Service.**
- (g) **Liaise with Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary within whose area Irish ferries, which carry substantial numbers of Rangers and Celtic supporters, berth and through whose area they subsequently travel after disembarking at Stranraer and Cairnryan.**
- (h) **Liaise with other Scottish and English Police forces through whose areas large numbers of Rangers and Celtic fans usually travel to both Ibrox and Celtic Park.**
- (i) **Liaise with the Divisional Commander of Strathclyde Police 'A' Division through whose Glasgow City Centre area the bulk of Rangers or Celtic, and possibly 'away' fans will most certainly pass.**
- (j) **Liaise with the Glasgow City Council's Roads Department to ensure that no ongoing road works will impede the free flow of traffic to and from the match.**
- (k) **Liaise with Glasgow City Council's cleansing Department to secure street cleaning services between kick-off and full-time in order to prevent the availability of bottles, cans, et cetera, if disorder breaks out after the match.**
- (l) **Liaise with Strathclyde Passenger Transport to secure the maximum flow of buses and underground trains before and after the match.**
- (m) **Liaise with the Meteorology Office in order to be conversant with likely weather conditions and the potential for a postponement or abandonment of the match.**
- (n) **Liaise with whichever company has the television rights for the match in order to determine and thereafter authorise their camera positions in accordance with the club's Safety Certificate, and**
- (o) **Liaise with Strathclyde Fire and Rescue to secure tenders on site or on standby.**
- (p) **Liaise with Strathclyde Police on all matters of terrorism that may impact the match**

This list is neither intended to be exhaustive nor constructed in any order of importance. It merely points to some of the actions that have to be completed to ensure a safe and successful match.

#### **THE PRE-MATCH MEETING**

Forty-eight hours prior to the match the host Safety Officer will also chair a Pre-Match Meeting.

The composition of those who attend this meeting varies from club to club but a selection from throughout Scotland include – **the Police, Stewarding Companies, Club Directors, Stadium Managers, Ticket Centre Managers, Commercial Managers, Corporate managers, Catering Managers, representatives of the SPL and SFA together with Fire and Ambulance.**

The one certainty however, is that the forthcoming match will be discussed in detail and nothing whatsoever left to chance.

Everyone on the day should know and understand the role that each of the others is undertaking.

A minute of the meeting is produced.

## STATEMENTS OF INTENT

Paragraph 3.24 of the **GUIDE TO SAFETY AT SPORTS GROUNDS** states:

**“If there is to be a police presence in or at the sports ground, management should discuss with the police the division of responsibilities and functions between the two parties; for example, whether particular posts are to be staffed by stewards or by police officers, and who will assume responsibility in particular circumstances.**

**The outcome of these discussions should be recorded in a statement of Intent,**

**It is emphasised that the statement of intent is a management Statement and not a legal document.”**

Statements of Intent are not widely used in Scotland to date and until such times as they are the Pre-Match Meeting serves as a suitable, and perhaps even better, means of achieving exactly the same end.

## GROUND INSPECTION

Twenty-four hours before the match the host Safety Officer or perhaps the Stadium Manager will also represent the club at a pre-match inspection of the ground along with the police.

The inspection usually covers important aspect of public safety, including:

- (a) **Basic structural conditions, state of terracing, including clearance of snow and ice and generally good housekeeping considerations within the ground, consistent with crowd safety and fire prevention objectives;**
- (b) **The effect of any maintenance and construction work on the safety and evacuation arrangements for the ground;**
- (c) **Exit routes are to be checked to ensure that they are clear and exit doors/gates are operating properly;**
- (d) **The erection, position and maintenance of high quality signposts giving clear instruction to the public on:-**
  - (i) **direction to turnstiles;**
  - (ii) **home and away support area;**
  - (iii) **segregated areas with ground;**
  - (iv) **turnstile numbers;**
  - (v) **notices at turnstiles outlining restrictions imposed by the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) act 1995 on patrons entering the ground;**
  - (vi) **e x i t s ;**
  - (vii) **police office;**
  - (viii) **first aid station**
  - (ix) **toilets (male and female);**
  - (x) **NO SMOKING and**
  - (xi) **the existence of CCTV.**

There is also merit in surveying the exterior of the ground and approach routes with a view to taking any action that may be necessary to reduce the availability of missiles and weapons, from obvious sources such as rubbish skips, scaffolding sites and ongoing building sites.

## **SAFETY CONFIRMATION**

Once gain, in terms of a condition contained in their respective Safety Certificates, it is incumbent upon both Rangers and Celtic Football Clubs to provide the Police Commander, 3 hours before the kick-off, with a written assurance that spectators may be safely admitted to, and remain within, the ground for the duration of the match.

The Stadium Manager, because of the specialist skills required to give this assurance, will normally sign this document on behalf of the Club.

## **REFEREE'S BRIEFING**

It is important too that the referee, upon his arrival at the ground, is briefed with regard to who is in charge on behalf of the Club and the Police; and where these 2 persons will be located from that moment onward.

It is sensible to ensure too that the referee is familiar with evacuation procedures, the public address messages that will initiate them; and that he is aware of his obligation to advise the Police Commander personally, 5 minutes before anybody else, that he either intends to postpone the match before the advertised kick-off time or during play. There is a set procedure that allows the latter to occur without the wider public becoming aware of it and thereafter rushing to exit gates that might still be closed.

## **UNACCEPTABLE CONDUCT**

### **SHOW RACISM THE RED CARD**

Show Racism the Red Card is an anti-racist charity, which was established in January 1996. The aim of our organisation is to produce anti-racist educational resources, which harness the high profile of professional footballers to combat racism

The organisation has built up a pool of professional footballers as patrons and one of the highlights of our work remains the interaction of the players with young people at our events at Football Clubs. In Scotland, we also have the job of trying to combat racism in football.

Show Racism The Red Card is an anti-racist educational charity. We aim to combat racism through enabling role models, who are predominately but not exclusively footballers, to present an anti-racist message to young people and others.

Show Racism The Red Card acknowledges that racism changes, as do the experiences of Black and Minority Ethnic communities in the UK. Our message and activities therefore need to be able to respond to such changes as and when appropriate.

We achieve this through:

- Producing educational resources
- Developing activities to encourage people, including young people, to challenge racism
- In parts of the UK, challenging racism in the game of football and other sports

**NIL BY MOUTH**

NIL BY MOUTH is a charity which was set up on 10 July 1999 with the key aim to combat bigotry and sectarianism in all its forms, and indeed the formation of the organisation can be traced to a brutal sectarian, football linked murder on 7 October 1995.

Both Rangers and Celtic Football Clubs have been pleased to support NIL BY MOUTH by way of substantial donations.

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**RESPECT - UEFA'S 11 KEY VALUES**

All football clubs in Scotland, aim to support, where appropriate, the guidelines issued by UEFA.

These encourage clubs to:-

1. Place Football first
2. Adopt a pyramid structure and subsidiarity
3. Promote unity and leadership
4. Install good governance and autonomy
5. Recognise football grassroots and solidarity
6. Promote youth protection and education
7. Focus on Sporting integrity and betting
8. Support financial fair play and regularity of competitions
9. Commitment to national teams and clubs
10. Respect
11. Protect the European sports model and specificity of sport

## ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN

Students studying architecture and design have been pleased to note the following safety features incorporated into various football grounds in Scotland:-

- **All-seated grounds in respect of which Safety Certificates have been granted under the Safety at Sports Grounds Act 1975.**
- **Adequate provision of turnstiles and exit gates.**
- **Professional stewarding, including Fire Stewarding.**
- **Spacious internal and external concourses.**
- **The provision of dedicated car parks for both 'home' and 'away' fans.**
- **The provision of parking spaces of Emergency Services vehicles.**
- **Internal and external CCTV systems linked stadium control points.**
- **High quality public address system.**
- **High quality fire alarm systems.**
- **Modern control points with 'Public Address', 'Stewards' Control', and 'Medical Control' rooms in close proximity to each other.**
- **Good internal and external lighting.**
- **No Smoking Policies, supported by signage.**
- **Electronic turnstile counting mechanisms.**
- **The provision of retractable tunnel to protect players and officials from injury by any objects which might be thrown.**
- **Wide, hard surface tracks around the perimeter of playing surfaces onto which fans can be evacuated in emergency situations.**
- **Easily opened 'emergency' gates giving access from stands and terraces towards the playing areas.**
- **An absence of fencing between stands/terraces and the playing areas.**
- **The provision of sand buckets to quickly douse any flares or fireworks that are thrown.**
- **The provision of electronic scoreboards and jumbotron screens which are capable of displaying written text messages.**
- **Tried and tested police and stewarding operations.**
- **Passageway patrols by stewards.**
- **Substantial season ticket holdings which means that these fans sit beside each other at every match and therefore settle into patterns of behaviour which are acceptable to each other and the authorities.**
- **Policies that ensure that matches are all-ticket, minimising queues and crushing.**
- **The employment of Safety Officers who are empowered to take action against fans whose behaviour proves to be unacceptable.**
- **The employment of Ticket Centre Managers and Stadium Managers who ensure that ticketing and maintenance matters are properly supervised.**
- **The employment of Health and Safety Mangers to ensure that all procedures adopted by clubs are safety based.**
- **Policies of full co-operation with the police, fire, and building control authorities whom regularly undertake 'spot checks' within grounds.**
- **Pre-match inspections.**
- **The provision of external bins to encourage the disposal on bottles, cans, et cetera.**
- **The provision of Doctors, paramedics and first aid personnel at matches.**
- **The provision of First Aid Stations within grounds.**
- **The provision of televisions on internal concourses, which broadcast games 'live' and therefore encourage an even distribution of fans to fast food outlets throughout matches.**
- **The application of plastic seals to exit gates which, without impeding emergency opening, deter unauthorised openings.**
- **Adoption of Ground Regulations, Safety Policies and Emergency Action Plans.**
- **The attendance at matches on standby of Scottish Power personnel and Lift Engineers in the event of system failures.**

